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Soft Belarusianisation. The ideology of Belarus  
in the era of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict
Piotr Rudkouski
Over the past three years, a distinct change has become visible in the ideological discourse 
of the government of Belarus. To an increasing degree, the state ideology is focusing on 
strengthening national identity, emphasising the divergence of Belarus’s interests from those 
of Russia, and re-examining the historical narration in a direction which emphasises the dis-
tinctiveness of the history of Belarus from that of Russia. Above all, the government has 
changed its attitude towards the Belarusian language and culture. A campaign promoting 
the Belarusian language is being carried out on a large scale – under the auspices of state 
ideologues. The government has also become involved in the promotion of vyshyvanki, tradi-
tional, embroidered Belarusian clothes and their ornamentation. This allows us to talk about 
a process of ‘soft Belarusianisation’. Articles criticising Kremlin policy have begun to appear 
fairly regularly in the government media. Official representatives of the authorities, while not 
going so far as to promote the idea of friendship with the West, no longer refer to it using the 
rhetoric of the ‘enemy’, as was previously the case.
This modification of ideological discourse probably means that the regime is looking for new 
ways to arrange its relationships, both with its own society and with the countries of the West. 
This does not mean, however, that the authorities are ready for systemic changes. The role of 
the President and the concept of the state remain unaltered in ideological discourse; there is still 
no tripartite division of power, and civil society’s room for manoeuvre remains narrow.
Belarusian ideology before Russia’s  
annexation of Crimea
The ideology of the Belarusian state has never 
been a coherent system with a clearly defined 
message, although it is possible to highlight 
some elements that have predominated for 
more than ten years in this discourse, since it 
was institutionalised in 2003.
First, the regime’s ideology spent a long time 
fighting against the version of the national idea 
which emphasised the Belarusian language 
and took a critical approach to the Soviet and 
Russian imperial eras in the history of Belarus. 
The state ideologues promoted a version of 
the national idea in which the central element 
was the modern Belarusian state, which owed 
its existence to Bolshevik power. As during the 
existence of the BSSR, the Belarusian language 
was not seen as an important element in the 
foundation of the state. During this period, 
the regime’s natural ideological allies were the 
Slavophiles and that part of the Communists 
who drew upon the heritage of the Communist 
Party of the BSSR.
Secondly, a belief predominated that the spe-
cificity of ‘Belarussianness’ lay not so much in 
cultural or historical differences, as the other 
way round – in total fidelity to Russian (and ulti-
mately Slavonic) civilisation. The idea of state 
sovereignty also emerged in ideological disco-
urse, but was usually accompanied by the stron-
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gly reiterated thesis that such sovereignty was 
only possible within the Union State of Russia 
and Belarus. The West was generally portrayed 
as the ‘traditional’ enemy of East Slavonic civi-
lisation, and thus of the Belarusian nation. This 
image was needed above all in the fight against 
the democratic opposition, which was ideologi-
cally and financially linked to the West. 
Thirdly, the Soviet period was idealised, and 
earlier periods in the history of Belarus were de-
precated, in particular the eras of the Principali-
ty of Polotsk and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
Back in 2014, the leading Belarusian ideologue 
Vladimir Melnik stressed that “the Belarusians 
took possession of their own statehood at the 
beginning of the 20th century, namely on 1 Ja-
nuary 1919”, i.e. upon the creation of the Byelo-
russian Soviet Socialist Republic. This, he wrote 
further, was the result of “the truly invaluable 
help of the fraternal Russian people in the cre-
ation, preservation and strengthening of the 
Belarusian state”1.
The first change: 
in the direction of ‘soft Belaruthenisation’
A light alteration of the national idea in the go-
vernment’s discourse had already begun a few 
years before the annexation of Crimea. In 2010-
2012, new textbooks on the history of Belarus 
were published which no longer presented the 
idea of ‘all-Russian‘ unity, as had previously 
been the case. However in the public space, 
formed by official ideologues, the message 
was still strong that Belarusian identity is clo-
1 Национальная идея или белорусская идея?, 
Беларуская думка 3/2014, p. 54, http://beldumka.belta.
by/isfiles/000167_941630.pdf
sely tied to Orthodox Russian civilisation. Until 
2014, Lev Krishtopovich, Vladimir Melnik and 
Cheslav Kirviel were the leading ideologues; it 
was they who promoted the Russocentric ver-
sion of Belarusian identity, and warred against 
Western European trends in Belarusian society.
Since the first half of 2014, more significant 
changes have become apparent in the official 
ideology of Belarusian identity. During this pe-
riod, President Lukashenko’s statements started 
to discuss the question of the Belarusian langu-
age more frequently than before, and always 
in a positive manner. In April that year, shortly 
after Russia’s occupation of Crimea, he said in 
a speech: “If we forget Russian, we will lose our 
mind. If we forget how to speak in Belarusian, we 
will cease to be a nation.” In the same speech, he 
implicitly criticised himself, saying, “They could 
be right, those who criticise me for neglecting 
the [Belarusian] language”2. This was a signal to 
the state ideologues that his previous language 
policy (of Russification) should no longer be tre-
ated as binding by government officials.
Other visible manifestations of interest in buil-
ding a national community have appeared at 
different levels of government. In summer 2014, 
the Belarusian parliament adopted a resolution 
‘On Belarusians abroad’3, which not only regu-
lates the Belarusian state’s cooperation with 
the diaspora, but also includes an ideological 
message. Article 2 speaks about the need to 
build a supra-territorial community, moreover, 
one which is based on the national culture. In 
the last two to three years, the Belarusian go-
vernment has actively engaged in promoting 
vyshyvanka embroidery, which is one of the 
most important attributes of the non-Soviet 
national culture. 
2 Послание Президента Республики Беларусь А. Г. 
Лукашенко белорусскому народу и Национальному 
собранию Республики Беларусь, «Сильная и экономика 
честная власть - фундамент независимости страны и 
процветания нации», 22 April 2014, http://pravo.by/
document/?guid=3871&p0=P014p0001
3 Аб беларусах замежжа, a bill passed by the House 
of Representatives on 14 May 2014, and adopted two 
weeks later by the Council of the Republic; came into 
force on 16 July 2014.
A light alteration of the attitude to the na-
tional idea in the government’s discourse 
had already begun a few years before the 
annexation of Crimea.
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As for the authorities’ attitude towards the 
most important national symbols, i.e. the 
white-red-white flag and the Pahonia coat of 
arms, their display in public spaces is still offi-
cially prohibited. However, in summer 2017 an 
event took place which could be understood 
as a harbinger of gradual changes in this area. 
On 13 June, the Liberal-Democratic Party of Be-
larus (LDPB) released a statement in which it cal-
led for the legalisation of the white-red-white 
flag and the Pahonia coat of arms, and for them 
to be given the status of historical and cultural 
values4. Considering the origin of this party and 
its specific function in the Belarusian political 
system, it is difficult to treat the statement abo-
ve as just an element of the usual changes in 
image. The LDPB was created in the first half 
of the 1990s as a branch of Vladimir Zhirino-
vsky’s Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, and 
a significant part of its history is marked by a 
struggle for Belarusian-Russian unity. Besides, 
this party is an instrument of the Belarusian go-
vernment, thanks to which the latter maintains 
a semblance of pluralism and can, in the event 
of a joint boycott from the real opposition, 
smother any attempts to create alternatives 
during elections. The statement above, coming 
from the ‘systemic opposition’, could be part of 
a process to prepare the public for the possible 
rehabilitation of these symbols.
The second change:  
Russia is more ‘them’ than ‘us’
In 2014, perhaps for the first time, an ideological 
conflict arose between Presidents Lukashenko 
and Putin. Earlier controversies between them 
were based on economic matters, or were sim-
ply personal animosities; however, since Russia 
took over Crimea, Lukashenko has publicly ac-
cused Russia of violating international law on at 
least three occasions. During an interview for 
Euronews TV on 1 October 2014, the Belaru-
sian president struck at the very core of Russian 
4 ЛДП заклікае легалізаваць бел-чырвона-белы сцяг 
і «Пагоню», http://belsat.eu/news/ldp-zaklikae-legaliza-
vats-bel-chyrvona-bely-stsyag-i-pagonyu/
propaganda’s argument that Crimea was once 
‘ours’ and ergo today must also be ‘ours’ aga-
in. Lukashenko pointed out that in accordance 
with the Kremlin’s logic, one could make a de-
mand to return to the days of the Batu-Khan 
(that is, to return a huge part of Russian terri-
tory to Mongolia), or demand the return of the 
Pskov and Smolensk regions to Belarus.
Changes in rhetoric towards Russia are also ta-
king place at other levels of power. In summer 
2014 Pavel Yakubovich, editor-in-chief of the pre-
sidential newspaper Belarus Segodnia, published 
a quite stinging criticism of Aleksandr Dugin, an 
influential Russian ideologue, who had called for 
a more aggressive policy towards Ukraine. Yaku-
bovich subjected Dugin’s approach to withering 
criticism, even though the latter had always been 
positive about Lukashenko, and his articles had 
even been published on the pages of Belarus Sie-
godnia itself. It is also noteworthy that Yakubo-
vich gave voice in this article to the belief that 
Dugin is ‘the Kremlin’s man’ and an ‘unofficial 
spokesman’ for the views of the Kremlin’s rulers. 
Shortly after the publication of Yakubovich’s ar-
ticle, the journal Belaruskaya Dumka printed an 
essay by Professor Leonid Lych, one of the most 
colourful Belarusian nationalists5, almost half of 
which was dedicated to condemning the Russifi-
cation policies of Tsarist Russia. 
In 2017, criticism of at least some aspects of 
Kremlin policy has persisted. During the ‘Gre-
at Conversation with the President’6 on 3 Fe-
bruary, Lukashenko said: “If Russian tanks en-
5 Л. Лыч, Духоўны дыямент нацыі, Беларуская думка, 
8/2014 http://beldumka.belta.by/isfiles/000167_819358.
pdf
6 “The Great Conversation with the President”, which 
took place on 3 February 2017, is Lukashenko’s meeting 
with journalists, experts, social activists, and represent-
atives of the Parliament and the ministries. Lukashenko 
responded to questions about the situation in the coun-
try for more than seven hours.
In 2014 an ideological conflict arose 
between Lukashenko and Putin for the 
first time.
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ter Belarus, they’ll leave here straight away”, 
and “Freedom and independence are more 
important than oil”7. In August 2017 an ar-
ticle was published in Belaruskaya Dumka by 
Aleksandr Gura, a principal military ideologue. 
In its six pages, the phrase ‘national interests’ 
appears 24 times and ‘national idea’ 10 times. 
The author concludes that “the Republic of 
Belarus defending its own national interests 
will not satisfy everyone”, and notes that the 
threats come both from the West and the East. 
However, it is also interesting that the author 
mentions threats from the West only once, and 
in quite vague terms. Meanwhile, threats from 
Russia are mentioned several times; in addition, 
the evaluation of the ‘Russian threat’ is more vi-
vid and specific than that of the ‘Western’ thre-
ats. As part of this evaluation, a reference to 
the ‘Russian world’ (russkiy mir) appears with 
a negative connotation8.
The third change: non-Soviet elements
Changes in the vision of the Soviet era are still 
minimal, and mostly consist in the admittance 
into the official discourse of non-Soviet ideolo-
gical elements, rather than any direct revision 
of the Soviet elements. In March 2017, the hi-
storian Olga Levko from Polatsk University was 
awarded the prestigious State Prize. The work 
which won her the award was entitled The sour-
ce of Belarusian statehood. The lands of Polotsk 
and Vitebsk from the 9th to the 18th century. It 
7 A recording of the ‘great conversation’ is available in the 
archives of Channel 1 of Belarusian TV: https://www.tvr.
by/televidenie/belarus-1/
8 See А. Гура, Основы консолидации общества, 
Беларуская думка 8/2017, pp. 82-83, http://beldumka.
belta.by/isfiles/000167_418626.pdf
is very significant that Professor Levko, like the 
co-author of the work Prof. Denis Dug, has ca-
tegorically spoken against the thesis of a short 
(i.e. since the start of the Soviet period) history 
of Belarusian statehood. After reading a summa-
ry of Levko’s work, Lukashenko allegedly said it 
“reflected an appropriate image of the creation 
of Belarusian statehood”, and added, “This truth 
must be inscribed and implanted in the minds of 
the people. Even if there is some sort of nationa-
lism in it, it is a healthy nationalism”9. There was 
also a reference to Levko’s concept in a sentence 
in the President’s address on Independence Day 
(3 July): “the Principality of Polotsk is our histo-
rical cradle”. It thus seems very likely that the 
Levko-Dug concept will be reflected in future 
editions of Belarusian history textbooks, as well 
as in the textbooks of Belarusian state ideology. 
In 2017 the Belarusian authorities were ac-
tively involved in the celebration of the 500th 
anniversary of the publication of the Bible by 
Frantsishak Skaryna, a Belarusian humanist of 
the Renaissance era, the first printer in the East 
Slavic lands, who translated part of the Bible 
into the Old Belarusian language. The public 
space this year has been filled with slogans and 
images of Skaryna and his work. In 2017 this 
topic has appeared in the government press al-
most as often as the Great Patriotic War, which 
(as we know) is an enormous part of the Bela-
rusian government’s discourse. For example, in 
the June issue of Belaruskaya Dumka five of the 
seventeen articles concerned the war10. Howe-
ver, in the August issue, seven of the eighteen 
articles were devoted to Skaryna11.
At the end of May 2017, an article appeared in 
Belarus Siegodnia entitled ‘In search of a na-
9 Лукашенко: историю становления белорусского 
государства нужно достоверно отразить в новых 
учебниках, http://www.belta.by/president/view/luka 
shenko-istoriju-stanovlenija-belorusskogo-gosu-
darstva-nuzhno-dostoverno-otrazit-v-novyh-ucheb-
nikah-235365-2017
10 Traditionally many articles on this topic are published in 
June to mark the anniversary of the Nazi attack on the So-
viet Union (22 June), as well as on the occasion of the an-
niversary of the liberation of Minsk from the Nazis (3 July).
11 Linked to this was the anniversary of the publication on 
6 August 1517 of the first translation of the Bible into 
the Old Belarusian language (the Skaryna Bible).
Changes in the vision of the Soviet era are 
still minimal, and mostly consist of the ad-
mittance into the discourse of non-Soviet 
ideological elements.
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tional idea’ by Piotr Krauchanka12, which inc-
luded moderate criticism of the Soviet period 
(especially the Stalinist era) and emphasised 
that “without the Belarusian People’s Repu-
blic (BPR), there would have been no Byelorus-
sian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR)”. A month 
after the publication of Krauchanka’s article, 
the same newspaper ran an article by Mikhail 
Strelets13, a representative of the establishment, 
supporting Krauchanka’s idea that ‘without the 
BPR there would have been no BSSR’. This is 
a new accent in the discussion of the role of 
the Soviet era, as previously the argument had 
been that the BPR was an ephemeral puppet of 
Germany which had no importance in the deve-
lopment of Belarusian statehood, and that only 
the Soviet era enabled the rise of the Belarusian 
state and the emancipation of the Belarusians 
as a separate nation.
Conclusions
However, there is no reason to claim that there 
has been a genuine breakthrough in the ideolo-
gical discourse of Belarus’s government, altho-
ugh there are clear symptoms of changes in this 
area. These are most visible in the field of the 
conception of national identity; here there has 
12 In the first half of the 1990s Krauchanka was the Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs; for a long time, however, he has 
been a non-establishment activist.
13 Беларусь Сегодня, 30 June 2017.
been a very clear move in the cultural direction 
(emphasising the Belarusian language and histo-
rical memory) of the national idea, while main-
taining the present focus on the state’s nation-
-building role. Less clear, but still visible, are the 
changes in determining Belarus’s geopolitical 
space. The West is no longer the clear enemy and 
Russia is not an unambiguous friend. Changes in 
the understanding of the Soviet past, however, 
remain minimal. In this respect, we are dealing 
with a tactic of accumulation: the introduction 
of new elements without denying the Soviet ele-
ment. The thesis about the key role of the Great 
Patriotic War in the history of Belarus remains 
an unquestioned dogma. Yet we may also ob-
serve an increasingly clear move towards the 
‘pre-Soviet’ stage in the history of Belarus. 
The effect of Crimea’s annexation to the chan-
ges in the Belarusian ideology seems unde-
niable. These events made Lukashenko aware 
that Moscow’s imperialist temptations must 
be treated very seriously. The broken ties with 
the West, the lack of a strong national identi-
ty among the citizens, as well as his country’s 
economic and energy dependency on Russia, 
all make Lukashenko vulnerable to the Kremlin. 
Strengthening his country’s national identity 
and improving relations with Western countries 
and the United States will not, of course, guaran-
tee protection against any possible aggression 
by Russia, but these moves mean that Kremlin 
strategists will not see Belarus as easy pickings.
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